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The lessons of the Chilean revolution, crush­
ed for the time being by the military junta, 
will long be discussed. Any final conclusions 
must be reached with caution, for the full 
facts of the situation and the assessments of 
surviving participants are only gradually com­
ing to light. The views raised here are provis­
ional, and are offered as a contribution to an 
ongoing analysis. They rely on the author’s 
study and impressions of Chile on a brief visit 
in 1965, on presently available material, and 
on the analysis made in his book by the 
young French revolutionary intellectual 
Regis Debray who had the opportunity just 
after the 1970 election victory to study the 
situation and talk at length with Allende. (1) 
(He had shortly before been released from a 
Bolivian jail where he had spent some years 
as a result of his association with the unsucc­
essful guerrilla war launched by Che Guevara 
in 1966.)
I propose to take four main dimensions of 
any revolution, and try to see them in their 
inter connections in Chile. These are the soc­
ial processes, the state of consciousness of 
the participants, tactics, and organisation.
1. The social process, viewed as such - that 
is, as far as one can do, objectively, independ­
ent of the state of consciousness of parties, 
classes or masses. It should be realised that 
this is an abstraction, not a statement of what 
actually exists - a major aspect, but still only
one aspect of the situation is taken. Three 
well-known (and no less important for that) 
features stand out in Chile:
a) The economic basis of power in owner­
ship of the means of production. In Chile 
this power of the local bourgeoisie merged 
with that of imperialism, and was ruthlessly 
exercised. The machinations of giant US 
corporation ITT and others; the withholding 
of credits and spare parts; the flight of capit 
al; agrarian, industrial and commercial sabot 
age; the strikes of the truckers (many of 
them expropriated landowners) show once 
again that unless this economic base is changed, 
power, including the power to make the posit 
ion of any government eventually untenable, 
remains in capitalist hands, and socialism is 
impossible.
Allende and the participants in the Popular 
Unity, as well as others such as the MIR out 
side it, were all conscious of this, and much 
was done by nationalising the copper industry, 
the banks, and government intervention of 
different kinds in various industries, in distrib 
uting landlords’ land to the peasants, and in 
encouraging and assisting the Pobladores (frin 
ge-dwellers - a very large section of the pop 
ulation of towns in Latin America) to squat 
on land and build dwellings, etc. However, 
active classes are needed to carry such meas­
ures through and overcome the opposing class 
power at the very grassroots in the processes
of production. There was such action, fairly 
widespread and spontaneous, though the ex­
tent and degree of socialist consciousness of it 
is not clear as yet, and there was encourage­
ment, though not unequivocal at all times, by 
the Popular Unity. In the end, however, the 
reaction was able to bring about a state of ec­
onomic chaos.
The Communist Party concentrated on inc­
reasing production in the nationalised and 
"controlled” industries to combat this, but in 
doing so they failed to place sufficient emph­
asis on the ultimately decisive political mobil­
isation.
b) Political power - army, police, courts, 
parliament, the bureaucracy (civil service) are 
not neutral, and still less are they an instrum­
ent of revolution. They must be smashed and 
replaced by new ones. This does not necessari­
ly mean that they must (or can always be) 
smashed all at once and in a particular way, 
but that must be the firmly held-to perspect­
ive and orientation.
The only organ of political power that was 
in fact “smashed” was the executive govern­
ment, and this was done by the mobilisation 
of the masses in the Presidential election (as 
in the US, the President appoints the govern­
ment). But it is the army that is the ultimate 
repository of political power, and possession 
of the executive government represented only 
a small, and a very insecure, section of the 
total power, as was evident from the beginning 
when even confirmation of Allende as Presid­
ent by the Congress (still controlled by react­
ion) came only after a sharp struggle, includ­
ing an attempted Rightwing putsch, and con­
siderable mass mobilisation.
So far as one can judge, the strategy of the 
Popular Unity was correct enough in the re­
spect that they planned to use (and did use) 
various laws - most passed by an earlier pop­
ular government and forgotten - to erode 
the economic power of capital, and to assist 
mass mobilisation, so as to create new ground 
to win the majority they did not yet have 
for the further development of revolution. 
They also spoke of not ultimately counting on 
the neutrality of the army or adherence to 
“the law” by the opposing classes, and it is 
therefore a great over-simplification to speak 
of them as espousing a “parliamentary road” 
to socialism.
They were also counting on the fact that 
conscripts, called up for only one year, were 
likely to be influenced more by their previous, 
than their army environment. During the coup
there were instances of rank and file soldiers 
fighting against the Junta, though these were 
not widespread.
Nevertheless, there is a lot of evidence indicat­
ing in practice, even if not in theory, that they 
did count too heavily on the enemy observing 
the law at all times, and the degree of likely 
neutrality of the army, and that these illusions 
as well as other factors mentioned later hamp­
ered their reliance on mass mobilisation, and 
colored their judgment of the tactical situat­
ion. This also heavily influenced what was ul­
timately a failure in strategic thinking. There 
was great division within the Popular Unity 
about the way forward, and the view which 
seems to have prevailed was that the main 
thing to do was to win a majority in a plebisc­
ite to change the constitution, or at Presiden­
tial elections in 1976. (The unresolved idea of 
Allende’s resignation mentioned later was in­
volved in this.) It seems to have been the 
view that even if they failed here, irreversible 
structural changes had already been made 
which would advance the socialist cause at a 
later date. Unfortunately, greater strategical 
clarity and unity was developed in the camp 
of the enemy, who acted, realising that there 
are circumstances in which voting majorities 
do not count, whatever the depth of bourg­
eois democratic traditions -though orientat­
ion on winning majority support in some form 
must always lie at the base of revolutionary 
strategy.
c) Self-action of the masses on a great scale 
is required to provide the necessary degree of 
force to overcome the power of the opposing 
classes in the economy, and politically, and 
also to develop the dynamics of self-transform 
ation and self-liberation which is in a sense the 
ultimate objective of socialist revolution.
There is little doubt that there was a consid­
erable degree of mass mobilisation, and that 
much of this was actively sought and welcom 
ed by the Popular Unity. For example, already 
in 1965 I saw some of the first “Poblaciones” 
in Santiago and Valparaiso, which were direct 
ly stimulated by the Communist Party of 
Chile. There was also realisation of the need 
for a new stage in this mobilisation after the 
abortive coup of June this year.
However there was as well some “bestowal 
of liberation from above” (e.g. of land on the 
peasants), hesitation in relying sufficiently 
on the workers, and an apparent failure of 
work in the armed forces. It is unjustified to 
say there was none, and this would be hard 
to believe, and contrary to indications given,
despite the illusions referred to. More likely 
this work was subordinated to these illusions 
and what flowed from them, and that this 
was also the source of the mistaken reaction 
to the sailors’ mutiny earlier this year, and of 
hope for a split in the armed forces instead of 
persistent and determined work to bring one 
about. The crucial importance of a split in 
the armed forces at a time of revolution is at­
tested by experience in all revolutions, and 
the point is forcefully made by many anal­
ysts. (2)
2. The state of consciousness, and the com­
plex interaction of organised revolutionaries 
and the masses.
The task of revolutionaries cannot be regard­
ed as confined to the propagation of truths, 
however important, about transforming the 
relations of production, smashing the state, 
the self-emancipation of the workers, or other 
marxist principles. Lenin, who was not given 
to rhetoric or flamboyant statements spoke 
of another vital principle: “ ... in order that 
actually the whole class, that actually the 
broad masses of toilers and those oppressed 
by capital may take up such a position (either 
of direct support of the vanguard, or at least 
of benevolent neutrality towards it), propa­
ganda and agitation alone are not enough.
For this the masses must have their own polit­
ical experience. Such is the fundamental law 
of all great revolutions.” (3)
“Fundamental law of revolution” - these 
are strong words. They mean that revolution­
aries cannot ignore or change at will the hist­
orically moulded and now existing mass out­
look, and must somehow relate mass action 
to it. One can "issue a call,” but this does not 
mean it will be heeded. It is the easiest thing 
in the world to write a scenario of revolution 
provided it is assumed that “the workers” are 
ready to follow the (correct) lead; but this 
means treating this “fundamental law of rev­
olution” as non-existent or of only passing sig 
nificance.
The point being raised can of course be used 
to excuse errors. That is not the intention - 
there were indeed failings in the more distant 
and the immediate past which contributed. 
But the reverse also paints a false picture, and 
is an inverted form of elitism which regards 
the masses as exercising no influence of their 
own and being entirely the creation of leader­
ship. Are revolutionaries in Australia to hold 
that we know how to create the necessary 
mass consciousness in another country when 
we are (or should be) only too conscious that
adherence to correct principles is not enough 
to change widely held attitudes here?
Many observers speak of the strong belief of 
large numbers of Chileans in bourgeois-demo­
cratic processes, and lade of developed social­
ist consciousness. For example, Debray in 
1970 described the key problem of the revol­
ution in these terms:
“First, a marked gap between class instinct 
and class consciousness, i.e., the fact that the 
political consciousness of the workers, or 
their consciousness of the long-term strategic 
interests of the proletariat and its allies in the 
struggle for hegemony, does not seem com­
mensurate with their spontaneous will to de­
fend their immediate vital interests. This dis­
location is hardly surprising, since political 
consciousness is by definition the attribute 
of a vanguard; but in the long run, in a revol­
utionary period, the protection of the immed­
iate interests of the workers, and the improve­
ment of their conditions of existence, depend 
on their ability to transform a discrete, static, 
defensive position into a line of offensive aim­
ing at the conquest and consolidation of pol­
itical power as a nationally answerable class. 
And, a second dislocation - the duplication 
of the first at a higher stage - the gap between 
class organisation (in quantity and quality) 
and the class consciousness itself. This is dis­
cernible at the union level (one quarter of the 
working class is unionised - and, as is to be 
expected, unionism is still steeped in the wage 
claim mentality and ‘economism’ of the bad 
old days); and at the political level, the level 
of the parties, especially the Socialist Party 
whose qualities in the organisation and mob­
ilisation of the masses and consistent discipl­
ine have not hitherto seemed commensurate 
with the political consciousness of its milit­
ants, nor with the objective responsibilities 
of its leaders in the conduct of the revolution. 
This phenomenon is still further underlined 
by the absorption of the available political 
cadres into the administrative and government 
al apparatus at the local and national level, 
thus depleting the strictly political format 
ions of leadership and cadres, leaving them 
anaemic and in no condition to perform their 
own tasks as vanguard organisations.” (4) 
Some might be tempted to conclude from 
such considerations that the campaigns cul­
minating in the elections were all a mistake. 
The MiR, however, in general no supporter 
of this activity, spoke in these terms of its 
role in developing mass consciousness:
“The Left’s electoral triumph constitutes an
enormous advance for the workers’ struggles, 
draws new sectors of the masses into the strug­
gle for socialism, and assures the legitimacy 
and mass character of the future social oon- 
fontation. It therefore favors the development 
of the revolution and for that reason is also 
beneficial for the revolutionary Left.” (5)
MIR also recognised the truth of Lenin’s 
“fundamental law” when they realised that 
calls to armed struggle would not be heeded, 
and that they (MIR) had to find the way to 
have their propaganda listened to: “We con 
sider most urgent, as a way of establishing 
our legitimacy among the Allendista masses, 
for us, as an organisation and in the mass 
fronts, to recognise Allende as president.” (6) 
And: “We must try to take the initiative in 
the struggle against the diehards, through 
mobilisations of the mass fronts or in the 
streets, or even through actions, which will 
necessarily have to be ‘sympathetic’ and 
‘clear,’ in that they must not contribute to 
creating ‘chaos’ and ‘provocation’ in the eyes 
of the workers.” (7)
At the same time, and reflecting the other 
side of the complex dialectics of interaction 
between organised revolutionaries and the 
masses, they had a more clear-sighted and 
healthier regard for the coming armed con 
frontation.
Naturally, pointing to these two sides does 
not of itself resolve the problem of the truth 
in the concrete circumstances. This requires 
more facts than are yet available to establish 
not whether there were mistakes in leader­
ship clearly there were, and serious ones 
but whether these were the overwhelming 
cause of the success of the coup.
There was widespread mass action, including 
establishment of workers’ control in factories, 
formation of ‘‘industrial cordons” (local co­
ordinating groups), and organisation of armed 
workers’ militias. But there is also evidence of 
disintegration, concentration on solving indi 
vidual or sectional economic problems (cop 
per workers’ strikes), and for the time being 
immoveable belief in bourgeois legality, while 
later reports indicate that earlier accounts 
greatly exaggerated the extent of armed re­
sistance to the coup. (8)
Also, it should never be forgotten that the 
government never achieved majority support, 
and it is facile to proclaim, as some critics do, 
that if the Popular Unity had only done the, 
to them obvious, (a) (b) or (c), they would 
have done so. This lacks the concrete know 
ledge and analysis that is essentia! to arrive
at the truth. (9)
Many on-the-spot observers have a view 
similar to that expressed by Debray: “I know 
of no way in which (the defeat) could have 
been prevented. Of course there were mistakes 
made. Looking back one can always see how 
some things could have been done better. But 
Chile had to go through this attempt at social 
change. There was no real alternative. But it is 
different now: as a result of the fascist coup, 
there is no other way open but armed struggle .” 
( 10)
3. Tactics. Lack of space and information 
make it impossible to attempt a general re 
view of tactics adopted at various stages of 
the struggle in the last three years, but a few 
general points seem to stand out.
It has already been mentioned that even 
Left critics such as the MIR recognised the 
fact that the tactics of aiming for an electoral 
victory for the presidency advanced mass con 
sciousness and the revolution. Also that it was 
correct and usef ul to use existing laws where 
available to serve the interests of workers and 
peasants, and that the mass outlook had to be 
taken into account by all in determining their 
actions. Having this in mind, the importance 
of manoeuvring to put the other side in the 
wrong in battles over the “ legality” of various 
measures cannot be lightly dismissed. Two 
years ago, an article in ALR (11), spoke of 
the coming crunch, which was, however, de 
layed for another two years as each side man 
oeuvred for position and sought to overcome 
differences within its ranks.
There was also a battle of tactics over pol­
itical work in the army, and the arming of 
workers after June, with the reactionary Con 
gress passing a special law under which the 
army searched for and confiscated weapons.
Of course all tactics also have a certain “log 
ic” of their own, making subsequent changes 
more difficult, and that those of the Popular 
Unity (leaving aside the - unnecessary - de­
gree of self-delusion accompanying them) 
posed difficulties in this respect in switching 
emphasis to new tactics as the situation re­
quired. But this does not speak against their 
admissibility, but rather for a far greater flexi 
bility in changing from one form to another 
All successful revolutionaries have stressed 
this.
There is also a great deal of debate about 
tactics towards the middle strata - small shop 
keepers, middle peasants (some had their land 
confiscated, with the MIR pressing for still 
^mailer plots to be taken over), professionals
and others, who seem to have ended up lar­
gely in the camp of the bourgeoisie. It is 
said that both too much, in some respects, 
and too little in others, was done, unnec­
essarily alienating sections of these strata.
Further facts may help to clarify the truth of 
these contentions. But in the long run, exper­
ience seems to show, resoluteness in carrying 
the class struggle forward provides the only 
possibility (not the certainty - nothing does 
that ) of victory at crucial times. The possible 
relation of this problem to current theories 
of the “two-stage” revolution is referred to 
below.
Another tactical problem is involved in re­
ports of unjustified attacks by Leftists on 
Catholicism in general, at a time when consid­
erable forces within the hierarchy as well as 
the rank and file were supporting the Popular 
Unity.
Similarly, some in the UP regarded all 
Christian Democrats as fascists, not differ 
entiating between workers who followed 
them, and the leaders, while Allende in 
particular seems to have assumed that all 
Christian Democrat leaders would respect 
the constitution to the end.
4. Organisation, and the solidarity of the re­
volutionary forces. It is clear that there was 
considerable disunity between the forces on 
the Left, both within the Popular Unity and 
outside it, and that within the many parties 
and groups there were also divisions and some­
times splits. The general picture now emerging 
is of widespread disintegration. In the event 
no party or group was able to establish its 
ideological and political ascendancy, and there 
was no consensus as to how the coming “crunch” 
clearly in evidence this year was to be resolved 
It appears Allende had advanced his resignation 
as a possibility, but even such a drastic step was 
not decisively resolved one way or the other.
From one point of view, this problem of co­
hesion lends support to the yearning for “one 
party of the working class,” and it is not de 
nied that in certain circumstances this may be 
desirable, and that in still rarer circumstances 
it may become possible. But in most countries 
this seems quite unrealisable in the foreseeable 
future. The issue is rather whether the continu­
ing fragmentation can be halted and some cent 
ripetal movement commenced. Nor should the 
later consequences of such a political evolution 
to a single party as revealed in the Soviet Un­
ion in particular be forgotten. And even in the 
Communist Party of Chile, which adhered to 
the traditional Stalin era “monolithism” (as 1
observed in the discussions of its 13th Con­
gress in 1965), differences emerged in orient 
ation, manifested particularly in actions by 
CUT (the trade union organisation largely 
under CP leadership) in supporting and fur 
thering the take-over of factories, some arm­
ing of the workers, and other activities after 
June this year, in contrast to the “dragging 
of the feet” in these respects by other CP 
leaders. Luis Corvalan, secretary of the party 
in a speech in March indicated a certain loss 
of orientation and drive when he said “Ever 
branch organisation and every leading comm) 
tee of the Party should be present both ment 
ally and physically where the decisive battles 
are fought...” (12). (Emphasis added.) How­
ever reports indicate that the CP suffered less 
disintegration than any other organisation.
There is also a tradition in most parties dev 
eloping in the Stalin period, of looking with 
uneasiness, or even suspicion, on spontaneou 
actions not organised under their aegis.
Further, there were the traditions of restnc 
ed internal democracy in the name of centra 
ism, decades long propagation of the Soviet 
model of socialism, and, despite some bold 
and independent thinking (e.g. on cultural 
matters), a general inhibition of theoretical 
enquiry beyond “acceptable” limits.
Put more particularly perhaps, I feel that 
there is, in the traditional CP movement, an 
under-estimation of the importance and scop 
of the struggle for hegemony, and especially 
in more developed capitalist countries, a nar­
rowing, in “economist” tradition, of the is­
sues and areas of ideological contention that 
are considered revolutionary. The consequent 
of economism are not overcome just by a cor 
bination of these concerns with ultimate poli 
ical issues, vital though they are. The “ideoloi 
ical” area between them, and its ramification 
have been greatly under-estimated and neglec 
ed. This is no less the case with the Socialist 
Party, and Allende himself, who it seems avo: 
ed much use of the available opportunities or 
the mass media on the strange grounds that 
the people were "sick of politics ” Nor were 
adequate mass media developed by the Popul 
Unity, or sufficient efforts made to restrict 
those of the reaction, in which ITT had a han
The disintegration also affected what mass 
media were in the hands of the UP, and there 
was the situation of some socialist and other 
papers attacking decisions of the UP, and 
people in it, more vociferously than did the 
right.
Also more particularly, the idea of the “two-
stage” revolution, which has almost unnotic­
ed filtered into thinking within the internat­
ional communist movement (see for example 
the 1969 document), may have had harmful 
effects on strategic thinking.
This certainly applies to developed countries 
like Australia. Here, the two-stage idea is that 
first there will (must) be an anti-monopoly, 
democratic revolution which will later be fol­
lowed by a socialist revolution. I am not argu­
ing against possible stages in any revolution, 
for one must be open-minded to concrete circ­
umstances. What is at stake here, however, is 
a strategy based on two stages. Without going 
into details, this concept is related to watering 
down demands and perspectives (which always 
leads in the direction of eoonomism and an 
emphasis on “unity” which buries principles), 
whereas in my view the conception of socialist 
revolution today must be deepened, and per­
spectives made more, not less, radical.
In countries like Chile, the issue is less clear 
cut National independence, completion of 
anti-feudal tasks especially in the countryside, 
democracy, economic development and raising 
of living standards, abolition of illiteracy, etc., 
can be conceived of as preceding socialism.
The Cuban revolution took place in two stages, 
the second, socialist stage occuring only about 
a year after the first.
But this very fact created a new situation. 
American imperialism and the ruling classes of 
the Latin American countries drew the con­
clusion that no such “democratic” revolution 
could be permitted, precisely because it con­
tained the inherent danger of proceeding to­
wards socialism, and thus the breadth and 
“latitude” usually thought to be associated 
with the “first stage” could not be counted on; 
rather the reverse.
Returning to the problem of the centrifugal 
forces still operating powerfully within the 
Left in most countries, the problem is ultimate­
ly one of theory. That is to say, the desired uni­
ty, as in Chile, was not attained because of the 
lack of a consensus on how even to approach 
the problem of analysing the revolution, and 
not because of a failure of “organisation." 
“Marxism” is surely the obvious answer? Yet 
it is precisely because there are deep divisions 
about the meaning and interpretation of marx- 
ist fundamentals that it can be said that a “theo 
retical” fragmentation lies at the base of the 
organisational fragmentation. This despite the 
fact that the differences are often, regrettably, 
buried within well-known propositions which 
apparently say the same things, but are so in
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terpreted in practice as to make them as differ­
ent as chalk and cheese, while the theoretical 
and philosophical assumptions involved are 
not even regarded as requiring examination.
As raised in an earlier article, more open and 
definite theoretical contention is essential to 
emergence from the present stage, not the mut 
ing of views in the name of a non-existent and 
at present unattainable “unity."
★ * *
What of the future of the Chilean revolution? 
The past does not return, and new problems 
and possibilities now arise. Whatever the 
causes, whatever the blame, failure can advan 
ce revolution, as witness the failure of the 
1905 revolution in Russia, and the defeats 
suffered by the Chinese revolution prior to 
the Long March. It should be remembered 
that Che Guevara’s guerrilla warfare failed, 
and that the urban guerrillas and others have 
not shown that their strategy is adequate for 
success. The most one can say is that a com­
bination of all available means, with flexible 
shifting from one to another as occasion de 
mands, will probably emerge.
It is now reported that the core of the cadres 
of most revolutionary groups avoided annihil 
ation by putting into effect previously prepar 
ed contingency plans (the existence of which 
incidentally also speaks against the complete 
dominance of parliamentarist illusions). It has 
been said that defeated armies learn their les­
son well, and one must extend best wishes to 
them in the revolutionary soul-searching 
which will be going on, and organise the ut­
most solidarity in the continuing struggle.
One other problem is that of the concept of 
a “hemispheric revolution" for the whole of 
Latin America. This was Che’s strategy, and 
Bolivia was chosen at least in part because, if 
a base could be built there, more or less in the 
centre of the South American continent, guer 
rillas could be dispatched into other countries 
This was just a schema, besides the other 
failings the venture had, but perhaps the de­
feat of the Chilean revolution, and the strug­
gles in Argentina and elsewhere may, in this 
unexpected way, lend the idea of a hemispher 
ic revolution more reality in the future. US 
imperialism and reaction in each country are 
certainly helping to make it so, and it is clear 
from other pjaces as well as Chile that an isol­
ated revolution will find itself in extreme dif 
ficulties for that reason alone.
For example, the Chilean revolution now 
more than ever needs the border with Argen-
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tina to remain open, which means that pol­
itical developments there which may affect 
this become of more than purely Argentine 
concern.
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